May 2001 - VOLUME 22 - NUMBER 5
An Interview with William Gould
William B. Gould IV is the Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law at the Stanford Law School, specializing in Labor and Employment Law. He was chair of the National Labor Relations Board during the Clinton Administration. He is the author of Labored Relations: Law, Politics and the National Labor Relations Board and Agenda for Reform, among numerous other books.
The employer that is adamant in its resistance to unionization has time on its side because workers who are entitled to a remedy may not even be found after a period of time. |
Multinational Monitor: How serious is the problem of delay is at the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)? Between 1994 and 1996, we got it down to the lowest level that it has
ever been since statistics were kept in the 1970s. It has begun to move upward since 1996. This was in a way a mirror image
of the political impasse that existed in Washington. The Board was increasingly
populated by insiders who did not have as a primary objective the resolution
of cases which came there. Right-wing ideologues who found a reason to
dissent in lengthy opinions slowed the process. I am not particularly optimistic about the future course of the Board
in this regard, although a few months ago the board did, subsequently
to the departure of two members, adopt a rule that I have long advocated
that would require the issuance of decisions at a relatively certain date.
MM: Doesnt delay skew to the benefit of employers? When I first became chairman, we used a procedure under section 10(j)
of the statute to an unprecedented degree. This authorizes the Board to
seek injunctive relief that is, to go to federal district
court immediately to enjoin dismissals and refusals to bargain, on the
theory that the passage of time will erode the effectiveness of any remedy
that the Board devises. I think we were quite successful for a period
of time in using that procedure. Senator Lott and the House Republican leadership were angry with our
use of this procedure and this was exhibit number one in their attempt
to scale back our appropriations and penalize us for behaving in a way
which they did not approve. Unfortunately, the number of injunctions sought
over these past three years or so has declined appreciably, much to the
satisfaction of a number of House Republicans. MM: How likely is a union supporter in a contested union election
to be fired? MM: Do you think that some of the studies that suggest that on
the order of one in 10 union supporters are fired are in the ballpark? But we do know that the remedies at the disposal of the Board are extremely
limited. As the Pucinski committee said in the 1960s, all too frequently
the remedies are a license fee for illegal behavior. So as long as we
dont have effective deterrence and we have restricted use of section
10(j) and the ongoing problem of delay, the costs for illegal conduct
are relatively small and this means that the incidence of unlawful dismissals
are going to be high. MM: What is the remedy for unlawful dismissal and what would you
like to see it be? MM: Whats the current state of law regarding employer threats
to close or move a plant in the case of unionization? But employers may engage in an economic prophecy about what the costs
of doing business are likely to be in a unionized environment and what
the costs have been for other employers in a unionized environment. If
an employer says, employer X had to shut down because of union demands,
or employer X was hobbled economically because of union strikes,
then that is a lawful statement. Of course, it becomes very difficult to distinguish what is lawful and
unlawful. My own view has long been that the business of attempting to
regulate speech and sort out what is a threat and what is an economic
prophecy is inherently futile and wastes the Boards assets. The Board ought to be able to mandate access on the part of unions so
that they can get their message to employees more effectively, through
presence on plant property and access to names and addresses of employees
at an early stage of the campaign. This is a problem that is particularly
important in this age of telecommuting where employees are not always
in contact with one another. I wrote an opinion in 1997 where I said that where employees are separated from one another physically, unions ought to be able to have the names and addresses of employees at an early stage of the campaign. But a majority of the Board has not accepted my view. They rejected this position in a decision that was issued a few months ago. |
The number one problem in labor law today is the nature of the employment relationship and the use of contingent workers, frequently through third parties like manpower agencies, which has made organizing more difficult. |
I think its particularly
important, given the resistance that many unions face in the electoral process,
that the law give a boost to the bargaining process when its in its embryonic stage. |
MM: Does your view reflect a sense that its not possible
to regulate employers speech effectively, or that in fact the law
should not regulate employers speech, even if it could? MM: Do you think generally that employers should have a right to
speak and be a part of the election process? MM: How has the rise in contract and contingency work affected
the unionization process? MM: Do you think the recognition process as it now exists in the
United States is too bound up with the idea of elections? If you could have very quick elections as the Canadians do, then I think
the process is fine. But theres a basic difference between the Canadian and U.S. laws.
All the controversies that we get into regarding about who will vote and
how broad the unit will be in Canada can be resolved after the vote takes
place. Frequently, it is not necessary to resolve the dispute, because
the margin of victory or defeat for the union is such that the number
of employees who are in dispute doesnt make any difference in the
outcome. So I think the Canadian approach of voting now and litigating
later is an approach that should be adopted in U.S. labor law. Though I attempted to move the Board somewhat toward this objective by
providing for more elections conducted while challenges to eligibility
were pending, as a general matter we cannot vote first and litigate later,
and I think that slows the process and makes the election process all
too frequently a second best method of determining employee sentiment. MM: What would an alternative be? MM: Under the statute, what are the possibilities for unions or
union-like organizations that dont win majority support in a workplace? I expressed the view in Agenda for Reform that where a substantial number
of employees express their desire to be represented by unions
perhaps on the order of 20 or 30 percent of the relevant workforce
that the employers should be compelled to negotiate on some items with
such unions on a members-only basis. Generally under our law, the union speaks as the exclusive bargaining
agent for all employees in the appropriate unit, whether they be members
or not. I thought it would be appropriate, particularly for unions which
narrowly lost an election, to provide for some form of representation
for the people who want to be represented by them, at least on a limited
set of issues. MM: Out of the unions that are recognized, how many of the new
unions win first contracts? Again, heres an area where I think we have something to learn from
the Canadians, who provide for first contract arbitration where the parties
are unable to resolve their differences. Most employees choose collective bargaining in the hope theyll
get a contract. If they dont get a contract, theyre going
to lose interest in the process. I think its particularly important, given the resistance that many
unions face in the electoral process, that the law give a boost to the
bargaining process when its in its embryonic stage. It should provide
for third-party impartial arbitration of conditions of employment that
the parties are unable to address through a collective bargaining agreement,
and in effect provide them with their first contract. MM: Do you think that the low strike level in the United States
suggests that the right to strike is not currently adequately protected? But when in their view it becomes impossible to resolve differences on
some other basis, I think the law is stacked against the unions and employees,
in the sense that the employers can permanently replace the strikers.
Weve seen a higher incidence of the use of that right in the last
20 years or so. I think it makes a mockery of the law to say as we do that the law protects
the right to strike, and yet simultaneously say that for all practical
purposes you can lose your job as a result of the strike. Who amongst
us is able to give up their job in order to assert a right? MM: From your perspective now, off the Board and in academe, do
you have any thoughts on the level of investment that the Clinton administration
made in trying to change the permanent replacement doctrine? MM: What about in the first two years of the administration? Robert
Reich says the administration didnt go all out on this issue as
it did, say, on NAFTA, and if it had, it might have been able to win a
change on this. |
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MM: Do you support the government contractor responsibility rule
so that the federal government does not award contracts to companies with
a record of law-breaking? MM: What sort of conduct should disqualify a company? MM: Is it the case that that the Bush administration has not yet
appointed an NLRB chair? MM: What changes are likely to come from the Bush Board? |
Just as employers that
do business with the government should be obliged to have affirmative action programs and be required not to discriminate for a variety of reasons, they should also be obliged to be good citizens when it comes to adhering to labor legislation as well as environmental legislation. |