The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) describes itself as a "professional
forum for study of defense and international security."
Located in the heart of London, RUSI is an incubator for the latest
defense establishment thinking. It is no great surprise to enter and find
Robert "Bud" McFarlane, formerly Ronald Reagan's national security adviser,
addressing a crowd of officers and bureaucrats.
The surprise last October was his message -- greater security for Great
Britain and the United States will be achieved not by building and deploying
more aircraft carriers and tanks in the Persian Gulf, but by increasing
energy efficiency and automobile fuel economy at home.
National security would best be served, McFarlane argued, by focusing
on reducing domestic demand for oil. Focusing on the supply of oil will
prove "ultimately inadequate," concluded McFarlane, who once worked for
the man who removed solar panels from the White House.
This is not your father's clean energy movement. At the symposium McFarlane
addressed, there was little discussion of climate change or other environmental
impacts of oil addiction. There was even less discussion of the human
rights issues that have plagued oil projects from Nigeria to Colombia
and Burma. The issue for McFarlane and the others at RUSI was simply national
security.
After discussing various aspects of the costs of oil addiction, including
the political and economic costs of maintaining security of supply, participants
in the symposium then argued the case for a transition from oil as the
principal source of portable fuels.
McFarlane and the RUSI may represent the future of national security
approaches to energy, but they are not the present.
In fact, the Bush-Cheney administration is perhaps the ultimate expression
of the "oil equals security" mindset. The administration's geopolitical
strategy -- based in significant part on the threat or actual use of force
-- in large part revolves around the perceived need to maintain access
to oil reserves, particularly in the Persian Gulf, but around the world
as well.
Beneath it All
To understand the politics of oil, it is important to understand both
the geology and the industry. The world is definitely not running out
of oil. Over the last 25 years, known reserves of oil have increased by
almost 70 percent. If all new exploration for oil and gas were to stop
tomorrow, the wells would not run dry for more than 40 years.
The amount of oil available is not simply a function of geology, but
also of economics, technology and politics. Identified, or proven, reserves
refer to oil and gas that have been discovered and remain in the ground,
but could be extracted quickly and economically using today's technology.
Additions to reserves can take place as technological advances allow
access to previously uneconomical oil, as has happened over the last decade
with deep offshore technology, horizontal drilling and the increased use
of advanced seismic mapping technology. Reserves growth also occurs during
the production process, through the extensions of old fields or the discovery
of new pools (fields) of petroleum. The price of oil or gas also has a
significant impact on reserves estimates -- as price goes up, the higher
cost of extraction from smaller, more marginal finds becomes more economically
viable, and those fields are added to proven reserve estimates.
Possible reserves figures, which are cited as an indication of how much
oil a region might hold for the future, are even more speculative -- although
recent technological improvements have improved the reliability of these
figures.
To further complicate the matter, both companies and countries have
financial incentives to either over- or under-estimate the amount of reserves
in their possession at any given time. It is a complicated business, and
outside the United States, there are no agreed standards for reserves
calculations.
In The New Economy of Oil, recently published by the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, the authors put forth the useful concept of
thinking of all the oil in the world as an iceberg. Visible above the
water line are those reserves that are proven, and economically viable
to extract today. Beneath the water are the much more vast reserves of
conventional and unconventional sources of oil that will become economical
as the price goes up and the technology evolves.
The Saudi Advantage
But while much of the world's oil may be beneath the metaphorical water
line, two-thirds of it are in the Persian Gulf. As long as the world is
dependent on oil, it will be dependent on the Persian Gulf. Production
varies from year to year, as the United States might import more oil from
Venezuela, Canada or Mexico -- but over the long run, it is the Persian
Gulf nations that are sitting on the motherlode.
And one country, Saudi Arabia, holds just over one quarter of all the
oil in the world. Saudi Arabia has proven reserves of 264 billion barrels
of oil, and possible reserves that are estimated by the U.S. Energy Information
Administration to be as high as one trillion barrels. The Saudis have
the world's largest production capacity, and the largest excess production
capacity. On a daily basis, Saudi Arabia currently produces 8 million
barrels per day.
Perhaps more importantly, it is the only country that can, on short
notice, produce an additional 2 million barrels a day. This means that
when disruptions in supply occur -- for example, when the Venezuelan oil
industry shuts down -- the Saudis are the only ones who can pick up the
slack.
For these reasons, the oil market revolves around Saudi Arabia. For
U.S. geopolitical strategists, this dependence on Saudi Arabia is a major
vulnerability which fundamentally shapes U.S. military policy.
Oil = Security
On October 20, 1973, Saudi Arabia exercised the power it wields based
on its dominant oil position, declaring an embargo of oil shipments to
the United States in retaliation for assistance to the Israeli military.
Other Arab nations quickly joined the embargo. They lifted the embargo
in March of the next year -- but the power of the threat of that weapon
has shaped U.S. energy and security policy since that time.
Three years later, President Carter's secretary of defense, Harold Brown,
testified before Congress that "there is no more serious threat to the
long-term security of the United States and to its allies than that which
stems from the growing deficiency of secure and assured energy resources."
In January 1980, the lingering fear generated by the embargo, combined
with events such as the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, led U.S. strategists to draw a line in the sand.
In his last State of the Union address, Jimmy Carter stated that any
"attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States,"
and pledged to defend that interest by "any means necessary, including
military force."
Five weeks later, the United States Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF) was formally established at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida.
By the time Ronald Reagan took office, the RDJTF included 100,000 Army
troops, 50,000 Marines, and additional Air Force and Navy personnel. In
January 1983, the RDJTF became the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), which
20 years later is overseeing the buildup of U.S. troops around Iraq.
Global War for Oil
Two decades after the establishment of USCENTCOM, the U.S. military has
clearly positioned itself to assert the Carter Doctrine on a global scale.
In March 2001, newly appointed Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham unveiled
the Bush/Cheney administration's process to create a new National Energy
Strategy "founded on the understanding that diversity of supply means
security of supply." In actuality, this strategy had been in place for
more than a decade. Although energy planners know that there is simply
not enough excess oil in the world to displace the central role of the
Persian Gulf nations, they have sought to maximize sources of oil from
elsewhere in order to diminish the power of the Gulf states.
Alternative oil suppliers immediately become, by definition, strategically
important in the U.S. military calculus, and there is a striking correlation
between the presence of oil and the deployment of the U.S. military globally.
- In Somalia, just before pro-U.S. President Mohamed Siad Barre was
overthrown in 1991, nearly two-thirds of the country's territory had
been granted as oil concessions to Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips.
Conoco even lent its Mogadishu corporate compound to the U.S. embassy
a few days before the Marines landed, with the first Bush administration's
special envoy using it as his temporary headquarters.
- The Andean countries of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador together
produce about 20 percent of the oil imported by the United States, more
than two million barrels a day. Venezuela is often the top supplier
of oil to the United States. Observers have long suspected that the
oil in this region was a central motivation for the U.S. involvement
in Colombia's civil war. In 2002, the Bush Administration allocated
$98 million to deploy 60 to 100 Special Forces troops to train a "Critical
Infrastructure Brigade" of Colombians for the explicit purpose of protecting
an Occidental Petroleum pipeline.
- In the Caspian region, which may contain as much as 200 billion barrels
in oil reserves, the U.S. military has been actively working to combat
terrorism -- and to secure possible pipeline routes for the export of
Caspian oil. In March 2001, the United States pledged $4.4 million in
military aid to oil-rich Azerbaijan. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mira Ricardel said the aid was "to counter threats such as terrorism,
to promote peace and stability in the Caucasus, and to develop trade
and transport corridors." Azeri President Heydar Aliyev more specifically
intermingled fighting terrorism and protecting oil pipelines, stating,
"Guaranteeing the security of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum
oil and gas pipelines is an integral part of our struggle against terrorism."
- In February 2001, Washington said it would provide the country of
Georgia with $64 million in military support, and promised to dispatch
180 Special Forces "advisers" to train up to 2,000 Georgians in anti-terrorism
techniques. According to an Interfax News Agency report, the Georgian
Defense Ministry said that "servicemen trained under the U.S. Train
and Equip program might help provide security for the [Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan]
pipeline."
- In 1997, BP and Halliburton (headed at the time by Dick Cheney) proposed
the Trans-Balkan pipeline (TBP) that would provide another export route
for Caspian oil via tanker to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast and through
Skopje in Macedonia to Vlore, a port in Albania. Two years later, U.S.
forces in southeast Kosovo began construction of Camp Bondsteel -- which
has become the largest new military base since the Vietnam War. In December
2002, ExxonMobil and Chevron Texaco both announced they were considering
participation in the Trans-Balkan pipeline.
- From Nigeria in the North to Angola in the South, West Africa holds
in excess of 33 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, already supplies
15 percent of U.S. oil imports, and could supply one quarter of U.S.
imports by 2015. In June 2002, a report from the private but well-connected
"African Oil Policy Initiative Group" recommended that the United States
declare the Gulf of Guinea a "vital interest," and that the United States
"should strongly consider the establishment of a regional homeport,
possibly on the islands of Sao Tome and Principe. Fradique de Menezes,
the President of Sao Tome and Principe, announced in August 2002 that
the United States had agreed to build a U.S. naval base in his country,
though the Pentagon denies any such plans.
Iraq, oil, war and security
If "security of supply" is indeed the Bush-Cheney administration's goal,
"securing" Iraq's oil goes a long way towards achieving it. Iraq holds
the world's second largest reserves of oil, 11 percent of the world's
known reserves. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates Iraq's
possible reserves at 220 billion barrels, or approximately 80 percent
of current proven Saudi reserves.
One concern in any invasion scenario is that war will lead to a temporary
reduction in supply, as Iraqi operations go off line. Iraq sells approximately
2 million barrels a day on the global market under the "Oil for Food"
program, and temporary loss of these supplies might send oil prices skyrocketing.
Three quarters of Iraq's daily production comes from just two fields --
Kirkuk in the north, and Rumaila in the south. Robert Ebel, energy program
director at the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic & International
Studies, has suggested that if U.S. Special Forces were to seize these
two fields in the opening moments of a war, 75 percent of Iraq's oil could
continue to flow onto a jittery oil market -- thus keeping prices from
spiking too high.
In a post-Saddam Iraq, the country would quickly be in a position to
dramatically increase production. If sanctions were removed and new drilling
technology was brought in by U.S. companies, Iraq's production could rise
from less than 3 million barrels a day currently to 6 million or perhaps
even 8 million barrels a day by 2010.
If a post-Saddam Iraq's production increases as expected over the next
decade, Iraq will be an insurance policy against Saudi Arabia. Increased
Iraqi production will certainly lessen the power of Saudi Arabia to manipulate
the global oil market, and could even serve as a buffer in event of an
unexpected loss of Saudi supplies.
U.S. oil companies will almost certainly benefit from a "regime change"
in Iraq. Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress (the
most prominent opposition group), has said that "American oil companies
will have a big shot" and that he favors the creation of a consortium
of U.S. oil companies to develop Iraq's oil.
U.S. officials have consistently and vehemently denied that oil is a
motivation in the buildup to war. On "60 Minutes," Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld was asked if the war was about oil and responded, "Nonsense.
It just isn't. There are certain things like that, myths that are floating
around. It has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil."
But almost no one takes that claim seriously. Whether oil is the most
important factor in going to war, or merely one of many considerations,
it is plain that the U.S. obsession with Iraq is due in significant part
to the country and region's oil reserves.
For Bush and Cheney, national security clearly involves using the military
to control the global diversity of oil supply needed by the world's largest
oil consumer, the United States. This view makes sense if you believe
that there are no viable alternatives to oil.
Thirty years ago, when the oil embargo shocked the United States, or
20 years ago, when the Carter Doctrine was just taking hold, alternative
energy was in its infancy. Today, however, auto companies are mass producing
hybrid cars, and prototype hydrogen fuel cell vehicles are being driven
in California. Testifying before Congress recently, former CIA Director
James Woolsey spoke out strongly in favor of alternative energy technology,
noting that "there is no incompatibility between being a hawk and being
a green." While that may be true, it is hard to imagine that the U.S.
global strategists would perceive vital national interest in the Persian
Gulf or in a half dozen other places around the world if the country were
fueled by solar power or hydrogen fuel cells. If the energy is limitless,
the supply will always be secure.
Steve Kretzmann is campaigns coordinator with the
Washington, D.C.-based Sustainable Energy and Environment Network.
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