Nuclear Dangers in South Korea

Confidential documents obtained by Multinational Monitor and Counterspy magazines reveal serious safety flaws in the operation and construction of nuclear power plants in South Korea, one of the world's largest markets for nuclear technology. The problems involve six plants using Westinghouse reactors (only one of which is operating) and four utilizing the engineering services of Bechtel Corporation.

The documents are an "Update Review of Safety Aspects of the Nuclear Power Program in the Republic of Korea," conducted by nuclear consultant Salomon Levy, a former General Electric executive; and a letter from the government-owned Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) to the U.S. Export-Import Bank in reply to an earlier study by Levy conducted in the spring of 1980. Both of Levy's studies were commissioned by the World Bank for the South Korean government.

The World Bank document was obtained by Multinational Monitor and Counterspy through sources in Tokyo, Japan. The KEPCO letter was obtained by a nuclear energy expert through the Freedom of Information Act. Both documents were released to the press on February 3, 1983.

Together, the two documents paint a picture of a government bureaucracy, unencumbered by public scrutiny or independent regulation, rushing headlong into a massive nuclear power program without regard for safety and health, or the possibilities of radiation exposure. According to the Levy study:

• schedules have taken precedence over safety in South Korea, and safety and quality personnel have been "pressured organizationally" not to extend schedules;
• three years after the accident at Three Mile Island, South Korea has yet to develop a "detailed and specific" TMI accident plan;
• South Korea has not developed a comprehensive program for the storage and disposal of radioactive wastes;
• the Korean nuclear program is plagued by deficiencies in operator qualifications and training, and faces difficulties because of a shortage in trained personnel;
• in violation of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations, four Korean plants do not have domestic reference plants in the U.S.;
• the South Korean government has ignored "most of the recommendations;" made by Levy in a 1980 report on Korean nuclear safety.

"The organization and the relevant documentation to control safety are still far from being in place in Korea," Levy concludes. "An integrated and complete Korean nuclear power safety program is not available."

Levy's charges raise serious doubts about the role of U.S. multinational corporations in South Korea's nuclear program. In the late 1970s - at strong U.S. urging - South Korea embarked on an ambitious nuclear program to fuel its rapidly-growing export-led economy. Under its current plans, South Korea - a country the size of the state of Indiana - will have over 25 nuclear power plants by the year 2000.

The largest number of orders in South Korea have gone to the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, which has sold six reactors to the Korean government. One reactor - scheduled for fueling in a few months - is a Canadian CANDU reactor. Two recent purchases were from Framatone, the state-owned French company which uses Westinghouse technology. Bechtel Corporation has engineered four of the plants and plays a key role in KEPCO, the government-run utility. Bechtel advises the utility on its equipment bids, and has invested $4.5 million in a fuel processing plant with the Korean Nuclear Engineering Company.

Nearly all of the costs of the American reactors in South Korea have been subsidized by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. As of 1982, the Bank had lent South Korea a total of $1.9 billion for the purchase of Westinghouse reactors, U.S. supplied fuel and Bechtel engineering services. South Korea has received more than one-fifth of all the Bank's nuclear-related loans (see chart).

Previous studies published in Multinational Monitor have shown that the U.S. government played a key role in influencing the Korean decision to develop nuclear power (see MM, June 1981 and March 1982). The U.S. State Department, according to these studies, applied heavy pressure on the South Korean government to buy U.S. plants in the 1970s, when nuclear power sales dropped in the U.S. And in a visit to Seoul shortly after the bloody Kwangju Uprising of May, 1980, the President of the U.S. Export-Import Bank provided key support to the new military government of Chun Doo Hwan by promising $600 million in new loans - primarily for the sale of Westinghouse reactors.

Levy's reports reveal that the Korean government has not abided by U.S. NRC regulations for Export-Import Bank licensees in foreign countries. The two documents together call into question the claims by the Korean and American governments, Bechtel and Westinghouse that Korean nuclear power plants are safe. Levy's conclusions also provide evidence that the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the U.S. State Department have sidestepped safety questions in their zeal to gain a market for the beleaguered U.S. nuclear industry.

The most serious charges in Levy's report concerns KEPCO's response to Levy's initial recommendations on safety made in 1980. In that report, Levy said the Korean nuclear power program was being developed too rapidly to safely manage its plants and waste, and charged that the Korean government did not have an adequate regulatory and quality assurance program. Levy also stated that South Korea was deficient in operating procedures and in training, and pointed out the lack of design changes since the Three Mile Island accident. Levy urged that South Korea slow down its nuclear expansion plans in order to develop a safer program.

In a 1981 letter to the U.S. Export Import Bank, KEPCO listed a number of areas in which it would improve its safety procedures, and gave its response to Levy's charges. But in his April, 1982 report, Levy notes that "it was disappointing to discover that most of the recommendations were still not in place (in 1982)... It is most important that KEPCO management and controlling Korean government bodies realize that nuclear power plants require continued upgrading in both equipment and personnel to achieve safety and high capacity factor."

Levy's Recommendations

Levy's recommendations in both reports were in five major areas: overall coordination of the program; responses to the Three Mile Island accident; radioactive wastes; operator qualifications and manpower; and the use of reference plants.

Overall coordination: One of the major problems of the Korean nuclear program, according to Levy, is the lack of an integrated national plan, from training of operators to the disposal of radioactive wastes. Part of the problem, he says is due to "animosity between the various organizations involved in nuclear development."

The Korean government, Levy says, should "announce and insist that safety and quality are just as important as meeting schedule requirements." "The impression was gathered," he says, "that safety and quality personnel were pressured organizationally not to extend schedules." His conclusion: "A total integrated and cooperative Korean nuclear program is needed."

The conflict between safety and schedules is a common one in South Korea. The country's heavy debt forces contractors to push construction schedules to maximize the use of the borrowed capital. But the result is often tragic: according to the International Labor Organization, the country has the highest accident rate in the industrialized world. Last year, over 30 workers were killed in one accident in downtown Seoul, when a subway construction site collapsed. The problems are compounded in nuclear power, where the consequences can be far-reaching. In a speech to economic ministers in 1981, President Chun "called for shortening the period of various government-sponsored construction works, including atomic power plants, with a view towards maximum economic profits," according to the Korea Herald.

Three Mile Island: In 1980, Levy recommended changes in Korean reactor operating procedures to reflect the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island accident in 1978. A major recommendation was that the simulator software at Kori-1 (the one operating plant) be modified to "permit TMI-type boiling in the reactor."

KEPCO replied that it was "planning to upgrade Kori simulator to enable simulation of multiple failures, operator errors, saturated conditions and natural circulation." But in 1982 Levy saw little progress on this critical issue. Noting that "new emergency procedures" had been implemented, he said they had "met with little success." The Kori simulator, he wrote, "should be modified to include primary coolant boiling or flashing ... Without this correction, the Kori training simulator cannot train operators to cope with small breaks, stuck open relief valves, or tube generator steam rupture. Such events account for a dominant portion of the safety risks projected at Kori-1 and Kori-2. "Similar changes have been made at the Surrey simulator, said Levy, adding "it should be possible to rapidly acquire the necessary change from the Surry-1 simulator."

Levy's conclusion on the TMI problems was that "a detailed and specific Korean TMI Action plan.. .has not been developed yet even though three years have elapsed since the accident."

Levy also said that "a definitive program is still not in place" for an integrated training simulator program in the nuclear units 5,6,7, and 8 - another recommendation made in 1980 but ignored by the Korean government.

Radioactive waste: In his first report, Levy wrote that a disposal plan for low activity nuclear waste in Korea "must be developed," and criticized the lack of a long-term plan for waste and storage. "There is an urgency to develop such a site and to define regulations to be associated with it," he wrote. He added that "even though site storage is provided, an accidental surge of rad-waste production could fill up the provided space sooner than expected." All Korean waste is stored on site; Korean officials claim they have room for ten years operation.

In KEPCO's reply to Levy, the Koreans replied that "this subject is already being discussed. .. We will take further action to resolve this matter."

Levy claims, however, that a Korean radioactive waste disposal plan "still needs to be accelerated due to its slow start and the long time necessary to implement it safely."

Shortage of manpower, operator qualifications: In his 1980 report, Levy criticized the Korean nuclear manpower program, and warned that "manpower resources are being strained by a surge in demand." Present KEPCO personnel, he said, "are capable of only basic operational support." Two major concerns were that all operating procedures were written in English, and that at the Kori training center, "trainees are given the operator examinations as many times as necessary until they pass it."

Manpower availability, said Levy, "could become the most important single issue to the continued safety of the Korean nuclear power program. It is probable that too much is being planned to be accomplished on too many fronts."

The KEPCO reply to these charges was that they had initiated a long-term recruiting and training program after Westinghouse training experts evaluated the utilities programs in January 1981. Kepco also announced a long-term recruiting program from Korean technical high schools and colleges.

But in 1982, Levy remained critical of the manpower program. "Korean nuclear manpower development is still a key issue," he wrote. "This recommendation was made in 1980 and progress has been limited to date." "Plant operator qualifications need to be increased," he added.

Levy also mentioned that language was still a problem. "A substantial portion of operator training time is spent understanding the English language... The use of Korean might free the operator to get into more technical understanding of plant behaviour."

Levy also described how the manpower situation is being stretched by the different designs in the Korean plants. "To date about 5 different models have been used for the ten ordered plants. Such variations in model design cannot help but put pressure on a difficult manpower situation."

Reference plants: One of the most serious charges brought by Levy in his first report concerned the use of reference plants in Korea. Levy noted that in three plants (Kori 1, 5 and 6 - all Westinghouse plants), reference plants provided by the company were in a foreign country (Taiwan and Yugoslavia). "With such a provision," Levy warned, "it is no longer possible to always establish what added or different requirements might have been imposed by the USNRC for that same class of plant in the USA. In other words, the specific level of safety required for such a plant becomes less precise with time." Levy recommended that each "purchase order should specify a domestic reference plant in that foreign country to identify the safety level to be implemented."

KEPCO's response was that "we are pretty sure that an acceptable level of safety has been achieved. Although we consider it is not always necessary to specify a reference plant... it would be useful to provide an adequate level of safety on a certain case."

In addition to this weak response, KEPCO admitted that, for Kori-2 (a two-loop plant) there was no updated plant to reference in the U.S. And for plants 5,6,7, and 8, "there was no suitable reference plant other than the plant in a third country." Thus as of mid-1981, five Korean nuclear power plants built by Westinghouse had no domestic references. And, as pointed out by Morris Rosen of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1977, the Yugoslavian reference plant is in turn referenced to a plant in Brazil, in turn referenced to a plant in Puerto Rico - which was cancelled before U.S. regulatory review of the design.

Despite the serious charges in these documents, none of the major agencies involved would comment. Salomon Levy, author of the studies, referred Multinational Monitor to the World Bank. "Any clarification must come from them," he said. But Korea specialists at the Bank denied any "substantive role" in the studies, and refused to comment on what they termed a "confidential document of the Korean government."

Westinghouse officials in Washington refused to answer any questions. The U.S. Export-Import Bank "didn't know about the report." And a press officer at the Korea Electric Power Corporation office in the Westinghouse Building in Pittsburgh, PA. could only say he was "not in a position to respond to the issues." .

The only official who would answer any questions on Korean nuclear safety was U.S. NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky, who visited South Korea in July, 1982. Upon returning, Gilinsky issued a report that recommended "that serious consideration should be given to increasing technical assistance to (South Korea) on LWR (light water reactor) safety." Asked to clarify those remarks, Gilinsky told Multinational Monitor that because South Korea was building a nuclear program "with a substantial U.S. technological base," he was interested in "close contacts with the Korean government." He admitted that South Korea has "certain problems in terms of technical backup; they don't have the depth we have here." But he would not comment on the Levy report, saying he had not seen it.

U.S. responsibility

The South Korean nuclear program is being built at a tremendous cost to the Korean economy. So far South Korea has spent over $9.3 billion for U.S. plants and over $3 billion for the three French and Canadian plants. In its next five year plan, over $6 billion has been budgeted for the nuclear program - 12% of the country's capital needs. One nuclear industry analyst has calculated that the total costs for the program will equal an entire year of the country's gross national product.

But the Korean nuclear program is not solely the responsibility of the Korean government. The U.S. has been heavily involved in the program since its inception, and is hoping to play a substantial role in the future. In January, President Reagan asked for a $10 billion increase in U.S. Export-Import Bank guarantee authority: and the bank lowered its rate for loans to South Korea by 2%. In making the request, an administration spokesperson mentioned the Korean nuclear program as one area where Exim-Bank financing would boost U.S. exports.

Bechtel corporation has increased its direct role in the Korean program as well, with a multi-million investment in the Korea Nuclear Engineering Company, a subsidiary of KEPCO. Korea Nuclear Engineering - which will be a 50% joint venture between Bechtel and the Korean government - will undertake the engineering for the upcoming nuclear plants in Korea, as well as future plants in other parts of the world - possibly even in the U.S.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation and two other U.S. companies - General Electric and Combustion Engineering - have submitted proposals to utilize the giant Changwon Industrial Complex on Korea's southeast coast as a site to manufacture reactor components. Though no decisions have been made, plans include building a reactor complex at the site and exporting parts overseas.

The plans of these multinationals depend on the nuclear industry making a rebound in the U.S. and the Third World. They also depend on the ability of the U.S. Export-Import Bank to finance the projects with a package that can compete with France and Japan, the U.S.'s major competitors in the nuclear field. Though neither outcome is certain, the companies are hedging their bets by lobbying for Eximbank fund increases, and maintaining their profiles in South Korea. 0

Tim Shorrock is the Editor of the Multinational Monitor.

A Korean Anti-Nuke Movement? Nowhere in the process of nuclear decision-making can Korean citizens participate or even have a say. U.S. corporations claim that the lack of nuclear protests in Korea is due to the acceptance of the need for nuclear electricity. In 1980, one company wrote that "the Korean people are fully aware of the lack of indigenous energy sources in Korea and, therefore, do not challenge the decisions of the government in energy matters." Another company attributed the lack of non-academic opposition to the "traditional Confucian respect for scholarship - that is, the technocrats. There is a general inclination to accept the opinions of experts and little inclination to get involved in issues that do not seem to have very immediate concern to the individual." But a Korean government official was more honest in an interview with the Los Angeles Times last year about the "silence." of government critics. "We would like to have this situation prevail until we get these nuclear stations in place," he said. "Anti-nuclear feelings can be contagious ... Before the people become hysterical, I think we will have to make them aware of what the real problems are." In private, however, many Korean academics and activists express deep reservations and fears about the nuclear program. One Korean energy consultant told this writer last year that even government advisors on energy could not speak out. "People like me who are opposed to nuclear power, what can we do?" he asked. "If I write an article for the paper, it will be censored. There is no discussion publicly of nuclear power; it is not allowed. So there can be no objective criticism. What am I going to do? Go out in the streets and shout? I'd be immediately arrested." In 1982, a group of Korean activists wrote to Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau before a visit to South Korea in which he pressed for more Canadian sales of reactors. The letter states that "our people are not able to participate in the process of planning and controlling the power plants. If you promote the sales in Korea when the mouths of the people are completely sealed, you will not be able to avoid the blame that you exploited the situation for your selfish motivation. We know that many of the reports on the nuclear power plants in Korea warn of their great danger. Therefore, we are gravely concerned." - T.S.