Rebuilding Nicaragua

Daniel Omega is general secretary of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the former president of Nicaragua.

Multinational Monitor: What has U.S. intervention meant for Central America?

Daniel Ortega: Enormous damage. Irreparable damage in the region, and particularly in Nicaragua. With the loss of life and the economic and social aspects, it has been a damage that cannot be recouped. You can't recover the things that, for a decade, a country like Nicaragua was unable to do because of the war imposed on it by the United States.

And I would say that the situation in Central America as a whole continues to be extremely delicate and high-risk. There are old conflicts that have still not been resolved - as in the case of Guatemala, where there is an armed movement - and new focos of conflict that have emerged, as in the case of Chiapas, a place which has enormous political and historical resonance for the entire Central American region. The damage that the U.S. attack inflicted has been so profound that there has not yet been a chance for our countries to revive themselves.

MM: How many died in Nicaragua, both directly from the war and from the lack of services and other damages caused by the war?

Ortega: Well, what you can speak of with certainty is the direct victims of the war - the dead, the mutilated, the wounded. And there we are speaking of some 47,000 Nicaraguans.

MM: And the dead?

Ortega: Half of that. Victims of war, Sandinista as well as non-Sandinista.

MM: What percentage of them were civilians?

Ortega:I would say that 10 percent of the victims belonged to the structure of the army or the armed structure of the contra. The rest were people that were between two forces, or people that took up arms, but not permanently, in a type of militia, Sandinista or contra.

MM: Why do you think the United States followed the strategy, explicitly declared by General John Galvin, the former head of the U.S. Southern Command, of having the contras attack "soft" or undefended targets?

Ortega: At the beginning of the war, they were combining blows against hard targets with blows against soft targets - schools, health centers, construction teams, drivers, etc. -people working in these types of activities. It was a type of war aimed at breaking the social expressions of the revolution in the countryside. They were also looking for a way to break our army, the kinds of defenses we had, aiming at the hard targets of the revolution - but they couldn't. So they eventually arrived at the point of expending their efforts almost entirely in terroristic action against the civilian population.

MM: When did that shift occur?

Ortega: I would say in 1988, after the Central American Peace Accords, one can speak of a change.

Remember that when the contras and their U.S. backers began the war, they began it with the idea of finishing off the revolution in the very short term. For that reason they made deals with the government of Honduras and the government of Costa Rica to give their territory to invade Nicaragua, with the perspective of a rapid operation. They mined the ports, downed bridges in large-scale operations, did sabotage, and staged massive incursions of contra forces to try to secure a beach through which to enter, including with U.S. troops.

But as the war became prolonged, it became clear they would not reach their goal of defeating us in the short run. Our defensive capacity succeeded in keeping them away, sealing them up in the mountains in a theater in which there was only the civilian population. And their actions came to concentrate on that population- against transport, against schools, against health centers, etc. At the same time as the Peace Accords, the financing for the war from the U.S. government was being restricted by Congress; they were then speaking of humanitarian aid. With limited resources to wage war, the contra activity became more and more concentrated on the soft targets as the hard targets became increasingly inaccessible.

MM: If it were theoretically possible to return to 1979 with knowledge of the plan of the United States, all its tactics and strategy, what would you do?

Ortega: One measure which we took in 1984 we would have moved up, but with modifications. I refer in this case to military service. When we began to fight the counterrevolution, we did it with massive forces of militia, and they suffered a great many casualties. It was in 1984 that we began forming the specialized combat forces. So we would start by forming those battalions, but not with youths called through conscription, but instead with volunteers who called themselves. That's in the military field.

In the economic realm, I think we would not repeat the mistake of concentrating our efforts in agrarian reform by means of state enterprises and cooperatives. Instead, we would concentrate more on handing over individual properties to campesinos and also being careful not to make the mistake of expropriating properties of campesinos who were not Somocistas. There were some campesinos who weren't Somocistas but whose properties we expropriated in pursuit of an economic project; that was a big mistake. Also, our policy of monopoly in the commercialization of basic grains, having the campesinos sell their product to a central buyer, that would have to be eliminated as well. Instead we would have a free market in the sale of the campesinos' grain.

MM: In your estimation, why was Washington so determined to attack Nicaragua?

Ortega: Because of the historic problem the United States has with Nicaragua. It was not something that sprung from Reagan's head. It's the policy of domination the United States has had over Nicaragua. For the United States, it has been an inadmissible idea that Nicaragua should be liberated or that Nicaragua should declare itself as a different democratic alternative.

We're talking about an attempt to snuff out the Latin American people's capacity for struggle, because for the United States, Nicaragua was a bad example - a bad example because, from the U.S. perspective, they did not want the Latin American peoples to see this small country succeed in liberating itself. So one has to kill this bad example. And to kill the bad example of the democratic economic alternative that was embodied in the Sandinista revolution, a revolutionary project which was not the traditional one, but which was totally new - the mixed economy, pluralism with respect to parties and nonalignment.

MM: If the Sandinistas once again become the government, is another U.S. attack possible?

Ortega: I don't think so. The situation has changed. First, there is the experience of war - much blood has flowed. The United States will not be interested in another conflict of this nature in Central America. Also, we ourselves will not be very interested in a policy like that of the decade of the 1980s. Independent of the good and bad parts that policy had, that is now an era that has been superseded. Now, one has to apply a policy that is adequate to the new reality. What is needed now is to consolidate and solidify the new economic sector that is in the process of being created with the popular sectors and the campesinos who received land, the army combatants who are receiving land, and those who were with the contras, who are also receiving land.

MM: But if the United States has a historic policy of opposing the liberation of countries like Nicaragua, why wouldn't it attack again? Don't the Sandinistas still have the intention of liberating the country?

Ortega: Yes, but you have to take into account that now the process of taking the government would be not by arms but by the vote. That's an element that would be in favor of the Nicaraguan people, in favor of Sandinismo, and that would run against an interventionist policy on the part of the United States.

MM: But you won the government by election in 1984, for example, and that didn't seem to make any difference as far as Washington was concerned.

Ortega: Yes, but at that time the United States didn't want elections in Nicaragua. They discounted the elections. But you have to take into account that by 1990 the United States and Bush didn't have an alternative but to accept elections in Nicaragua. Why? Because the policy of war had by that time failed, and Bush knew it. The advance of circumstances has provided a space for them to proceed with a change of policy. That is not to say that it will eliminate the U.S. process of fomenting problems within the countries of Latin America and with Nicaragua. That continues in latent form. But I think that the space for the big infractions that they I committed] in the past- war, blockade, embargo, mining the ports, etc. - will he very restricted if the Frente returns by the vote.

MM: In what sense did the U.S. war policy fail? They did, in fact, succeed in removing you from power.

Ortega: But they did not dismantle the power of the revolution. It is not the same to remove one from power by means of elections as it is to be removed by means of the contra forces entering Managua. That didn't happen. That is what they wanted. That is what Reagan wanted. That's why they didn't concede the elections of 1984. Because they wanted to defeat us, politically and physically, they wanted to eliminate us. And that they couldn't do.

MM: If you come hack to power again, what will be the role of international capital in the economy of Nicaragua?

Ortega: We're open to foreign investment, but at the same time, we cannot make foreign investment the basis of our hope for development It has to play a complementary role and be done in accord with a Nicaraguan logic.

MM: And specifically, what would the rules or restrictions be?

Ortega: The basis would be respect for private property as well as for social property, and the various forms of property that exist in our country. I think that is a principle that we have to understand, respect for the various forms. And as to foreign investment, appropriate rules so that one can guarantee the placement of capital in our country and likewise so that one can guarantee recoupment of capital through profits as well - both placement as well as recoupment.

MM: There is presently a great deal of investment in the region in maquiladoras. Would there be this type of investment in Nicaragua under a Sandinista government?

Ortega: Clearly. I would say, they would act as a complementary activity, generating jobs above all, taking into account the very large unemployment which exists in our country. And we won't, in the short term, have the capacity to give a response to the problem of unemployment, although the Sandinista government has to give it priority.

MM: But the model of the maquila is based on very low wages in places where unions are practically nonexistent.

Ortega: I think that is a point that you have to look at. In the case of Nicaragua, at least, there have been abuses on the part of some maquiladora enterprises - not all, but some. They have abused and denied the rights of the workers and paid salaries that are too low. And that is something that one can regulate, that should be regulated.

MM: But if a Sandinista government had that attitude, would the maquilas arrive and stay in Nicaragua, or would they simply go to Honduras, Guatemala or El Salvador?

Ortega: The most important thing is security and stability. There would be the factors of security for investment and security for recoupment. If they get that, they will come. If not, they won't come.

MM: What will the impact be of' the Nicaraguan government's new accord with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank?

Ortega: I think it will have a very negative impact, because it will not contribute to giving a productive alternative for employment in our country. To the contrary, it imposes more restrictions, more unemployment, a worsening recession. It imposes a great weight which will make it impossible to bring about better conditions

MM: And what is the likely impact of the Helms Amendment?

Ortega: In April there was a resolution introduced by Jesse Helms which demands that Nicaragua return properties expropriated from American citizens. This includes both Americans born in the United States who were aligned with Somocismo, as well as Somocistas who were born in Nicaragua but became U.S. citizens after 1979. If, within 90 days, by June 30, the properties are not returned, the United States will cut its aid to Nicaragua, direct and multilateral, including the World Bank, IMF, and Inter-American Development Bank.

[If passed,] this would be catastrophic for the stability of the country. Much of the property which the amendment wants returned is agricultural property now in the hands of workers and campesinos, even campesinos who were aligned with the contras, who got land from the state, land confiscated by the revolution. When the current government tried to privatize, we said, "OK, but do it for the benefit of workers, cooperatives, retired military and contras without land." And in this way land has found its way into the hands of campesinos as well as newly privatized industries

There are already established legal channels, and any American citizen who wants to can make a claim. But they must follow the Nicaraguan legal system. It is unacceptable that an American citizen would come to threaten our country Can you imagine if a Latin American citizen made some claim against the United States? I can't imagine a Latin American country imposing sanctions against the United States. In that case we would have many demands against the United States, considering all the damage it has done to Nicaragua.

In the 1980s, when we did make a claim against the United States, the World Court ruling was actually in our favor. But the United States refused to pay the indemnity. But imagine if the United States made good! We'd have plenty of money to pay hack any U.S. citizen, pay back the debt, and still have resources in the country. The Helms amendment makes things dangerous because once again it asserts the threat of coercion against Nicaragua. It has to worn, all Nicaraguans. It would mean applying once again a policy of sanctions against Nicaragua.

MM: And the Helms Amendment would have the effect of negating the recent pact with the World Bank and the IMF?

Ortega: Yes

MM: But if the IMF-World Bank pact has negative conditions for Nicaragua, why wouldn't it be good to cancel it?

Ortega: What the Helms amendment would cut off is the positive part, the incoming money. The negative part has been paid for and is being paid: the restrictions on public spending, the increased unemployment, etc. That is already being paid; it is in effect. What would be cut off are the few benefits which the pact delivers, through the financing from the Inter-American Development Bank, through the World Bank, through the IMF. So Nicaragua would have paid the costs but would not receive the benefits.

MM: Do you think there should be Nuremberg-style trials against the U.S. officials who were involved in the crimes of the contra?

Ortega: I don't have any desire for vengeance. I think that more than a Nuremberg for Reagan, what we need is to indemnify Nicaragua, for the United States to respect the World Court ruling.

MM: What is the CIA currently doing in Nicaragua?

Ortega: They're always very active with the groups of the right, like that of Arnoldo Aleman [ the current mayor of Managua and a likely presidential candidate J, and also the recontra groups. These groups have connections with the CIA and also with Cubans in Miami.

MM: The CIA is concretely aiding the recontra?

Ortega: Yes. There has been aid, including, two years ago, facilitating the escape of one of the recontra commanders who had been cornered by the army; he was rescued and taken to the United States. He was encircled by the army, at the point of being captured or killed, but the U.S. Embassy and the CIA intervened to see that he was not killed or captured. Later, with the aid of the CIA, he got false documentation and penetrated Nicaraguan territory. After that, he died in a battle with special forces of the army. It came to be a well-known case.

MM: What do you think the CIA strategy s?

Ortega: To work with groups of the right to maintain an element of pressure against what they consider to be the manifestations of Sandinismo.